Sunday, August 26, 2012

Foucault and Ohmann: I'm Watching You!

After reading Foucault's "Panopticism" and Ohmann's "Literacy, Technology, and Monopoly Capital," it is really hard to figure out how to express all the connections I made on this linear piece of paper. However, I will do my best to be as linear/logical as possible.

I take Foucault's argument to be that the most effective tool for efficiency, control, production, and social interaction (a lot of political and economic metaphors, which I also noticed in Ohmann), is a mechanism, of any sort, really, that takes on a life of its own and camouflages perfectly with the status quo. The panoptic view accomplishes this goal of camouflage and obscurity, because it stems from a Freudian psychological impulse/instinct to watch, be watched, and everything in between. Therefore, another criterion for successful world domination is the threat of psychological intimidation, which can be as intense (or not) as the individual chooses to make it. 

As far as how Foucault's panopticism theory converges with attitudes about technological expansion, I could not help but instantly think that all of the online activities in which modern society participates -- Facebook, Twitter, Ratemyprofessor.com -- all let members of society know that we are being watched. Particularly, I made the connection between panopticism and technology when Foucault states "Power has its principle not so much in a person as a certain concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes; in an arrangement whose internal mechanisms produce the relation in which individuals are caught up" (202). The online internet atmosphere provides the various "surfaces," "lights," "gazes," etc., and bodies collectively engaging in this atmosphere are presently very "caught up" in all of these different arenas for communicating. Therefore, the online atmosphere, and all the technologies that construct it, provide a great deal of power to someone -- maybe whoever chooses to look.

Also, on page 204, when Foucault explains that the Panopticon allows for constant supervision, ASSESSMENT, order, productivity, etc., I put in my notes: "I can't help but connect this to standardized testing!" I realize it is overwrought to assert that standardized testing directly equals the Panopticon, but much of the economic/efficiency arguments about standardized testing and placement discussed in Dr. Condon's writing assessment course last year reflect Foucault's description of the Panopticon's power to judge quality and quantity of production.

With no real smooth segue, having read Foucault first, I noticed all kinds of parallel arguments in Ohmann's piece.  Ohmann's observation that definitions of literacy have become a way to measure behaviors connected to class/status, and that literacy became defined technological advances used to further production make me ask this question: does literacy, or defintions of literacy connected to economics equal the Panopticon? I especially wonder, because Ohmann  illustrates in his examples on page 680 of what technologies could have become, if real agency existed, that agency and definition of a technology by actual users is often missing or in conflict with an institution's intended purpose. So, if institutions dictate how new technologies are used and assess levels of literacy with these technologies, then how are technology and literacy writ large NOT the Panopticon?

Due to these questions, I think that Ohmann's piece is still very relevant, especially because of the discussions I hear off and on about whether or not someone is using a technology correctly. Like, is there a wrong way to use Twitter, Facebook, etc.? I don't really think so, but others might. So, then, who decides? Do we or do institutions decide?

Tuesday, August 21, 2012

Response to Wysocki and Lauer

One interesting thread between the two readings was the way in which naming and labeling of multimodal, new media, digital, etc. text corresponds to the way that proponents think the texts should be used or perceived.  In the emboldened part right under "Opening 3" on page 15, Wysocki claims that "we should call 'new media texts' those that have been made by composers who are aware of the range of materialities of texts and who then highlight the materiality." As I understand this in the context of the rest of the chapter, the composers make a "new media text" suited for a particular purpose that those reading the texts can visually see and interpret. Based on Lauer's arguments and interviews in her piece, materiality correlates to the particular name or label that under which the "new media text" is put. 

This idea became evident once I began to listen to the "Audience-Oriented" section of Part 2, and particularly "Writing Grants." Prior to listening to that particular segment, I felt like I was floating along on this calm wave or even vacuum of thinking about names of texts in ways that possibly correspond to personal preference. However, DeWitt woke me up, so to speak, and reminded me that making, naming, and using text becomes an exercise in argument, persuasion, and securing monetary compensation. Also, the names change, depending upon the people with whom we speak, such as parents, colleagues, students, administrators. I was even struck by Palmeri's honesty in saying that as long as he could call the "thing" a ham sandwich and still do what he chose, he'd be fine with it. The "ham sandwich" concept also loops back to Wysocki's observation that "[b]eing alert to how agency and materiality entwine can also help us see how the definition we use -- and hence how we understand our technologies -- might obscure the agency we do have" (18), but in reverse. The interviews discussing audience indicate the materiality highlighted and the names/definitions constructed are what provide the agency in the first place. Yes, the different names for different audiences temporarily limits the perception being brought up for discussion, but the limitation happens wittingly and with the intention of creating various limited snippets, which add up to a complex picture.